After the Soviet Union officially dissolved in late 1991, Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan called for dissolving the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) too. All that spending on “intelligence” that in no serious way predicted the Soviet Union’s demise.
Though Moynihan didn’t get his wish, he arguably called into question the mystical view of intelligence services as being glamorous and all-knowing. Not really. Not really at all. Let’s not forget that the CIA didn’t just not foresee the Soviet Union’s imminent collapse, it also didn’t see that as opposed to it having an economy half the size of the U.S.’s, the Soviet Union really didn’t have an economy at all.
Moynihan was right, and the proverbial Swamp was wrong. Worse, creations of government almost never die. Particularly big bureaucracies like the CIA.
Moynihan’s call for the CIA’s dissolution came to mind while reading John Pomfret’s excellent 2021 book, From Warsaw With Love: Polish Spies, The CIA, and the Forging of an Unlikely Alliance.
Early in the book, Pomfret cited a 1978 Time magazine piece (p. 12) that ranked Poland’s intelligence service behind only those of the U.S., Soviet Union, Israel and Great Britain when it came to effectiveness. "Who knew" might be one way of looking at the ranking, but also who cares?
It’s difficult to answer the second question. Should we or should we not care? Seriously, what would Moynihan, were he alive today, say about the CIA and Mossad (apparently #1 and #4 in the 1978 Time ranking) after the tragedy of October 7, 2023? How did neither service know? And if they didn’t know, what’s the point to maintaining both?
The answer to the question is that readers can decide. Whether intelligence services rate their cost or not, what they do is fascinating. Or it reads that way. Pomfret’s book was a joy to read, and for reasons beyond the cloak & dagger stuff that cause more than a few readers to pick up these books to begin with.
For one, there’s comfort in From Warsaw With Love. Your reviewer has long argued that the fear about the rise of “socialism” in the U.S. is overdone. Americans are congenitally ambitious, particularly New Yorkers. Even the socialists in New York are ambitious, which means they want more. Socialism will never catch on in the United States not just because it’s unnatural, but because it’s particularly unnatural to the American people. Pomfret confirms as much, albeit through the prism of Poland.
He writes (p. 7) that “communism never took root in Polish soil, as it had in the neighboring USSR. The heft of the Catholic Church and the cussedness of the Polish peasantry were mostly to blame.” Pomfret quotes no less than Josef Stalin as observing that imposing socialism on Poland, was "like saddling a cow.” Yes!
Socialism never landed in Poland. Which means it will never land in the U.S. The latter will hopefully not be construed as a Pollyannish assertion, rather it will hopefully be seen as an observation that Americans descend from the people who risked it all for a taste of personal and economic freedom. To then pretend that we would give up the production that so animates our existence reads as happily unlikely.
Which brings us to the industrial side of espionage. In the book, readers are first introduced to Marian Zacharski. Evidence of the difficultly the Soviets had in making the Poles embrace socialism can be found in Zacharski being sent to the Southern California in service of a lathe company in Poland. He was in sales, and very good at sales.
Zacharski’s proximity to the aerospace industry and a particular American executive in the industry (they lived in the same apartment complex) eventually made him an attractive source for the Polish intelligence services, or the Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa (SB). The SB was Poland’s KGB.
Pomfret writes that Zacharski’s haul of information about U.S. stealth technology research, information about the Apache attack helicopter, Hawk missiles and more soon “swamped” his direct reports in Warsaw. Good for Zacharski? Good for Poland? Not really.
Which is seemingly the point. Pomfret cites the memoirs of Czeslaw Kisczak, former Polish minister of interior, to show why the accession of such high-value information was anything but. Kisczak recalled that (p. 20) “even our most outstanding scientists had no idea how to deal with material supplied by Zacharski, not to mention how to put it to practical use.” Yes, precisely.
What you’ve read is a logical response to the myriad China hawks, paranoids, and other pejoratives. Presently they’re frothing at the mouth about – gasp – Nvidia’s AI chips finding their way to China. Oh well, the latter was inevitable. And that would be true even if Jensen Huang were as cluelessly hawkish about China as his critics are. Exactly because Nvidia’s AI chips are the best in the world, there’s no keeping them out of China. Assuming an embargo foisted on China, the latter doesn’t control, nor did it control the flow of Nvidia AI chips into China from other countries not embargoed.
From there, see Kisczak again. Nvidia’s AI chips are the world’s best. That being true, and that being vivified by Nvidia’s market cap, what on earth could spies or even industrial spies do with such high-quality market goods? Sorry, but genius can’t be copied. But assuming the copycatting of Nvidia AI chips, by the very description it’s a look backwards. Always. Nvidia’s market cap isn’t what it is because investors believe it’s reached the frontier of its capabilities
Except there’s more on the technology front. Consider what you’re about to read with the CIA top of mind. It’s not just that Poland’s top minds couldn’t grasp U.S. technology, or put it to practical use, it’s that in the words of Zacharski, U.S. technology (p. 21) “showed us that we had no chance to catch up.” Stop and think about it.
If the Poles knew they had no chance to catch up to the world’s superpower, so by extension did the Soviets know the same. Which raises more questions. How did the CIA not know? Said another way, to read Pomfret is to not gain much confidence in U.S. intelligence.
What’s fascinating is that the genius of the U.S. itself (think its private sector) lent itself to the perception that the U.S. was operating on another level. Pomfret writes (p. 29) that “Ameryka” was “a magic word, and world, to the Poles.” This is important, and crucial to remember now. When the U.S. imposes tariffs, beats up on the very few (relative to the U.S.’s many) Chinese commercial success stories like TikTok, or invades nations like Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq that present no serious threat to it, it shrinks the very brand that makes it so formidable to begin with. To read Pomfret is to speculate that global intelligence services aren’t presently as impressed with a much more prosperous “Ameryka” relative to the much less prosperous one that awed SB agents.
Back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, U.S. intelligence services could make huge mistakes. But per Pomfret (p. 43) “a typical Eastern Bloc view of American intelligence operations” was that “the omniscient US services could do no wrong.” Better yet, the myriad U.S. intelligence errors were viewed as attempts by the all-knowing American agents to feign stupidity that didn’t otherwise exist.
Proud as Poland’s intelligence services are, and skilled as its elite fighting force is (GROM, their version of Navy SEALS, or Delta Force), the story of Poland remains a sad one. Having visited Poland once, the tragedy is most evident in Warsaw itself. Most of the buildings are drab, 1950s, 60s, and 70s “modern,” which seemingly reflects a city reduced to rubble during WWII.
So much plainly factored into Poland’s destruction, but Pomfret makes the interesting point (p. 51) that Poland “has no natural barriers to a conquering hoard,” while Switzerland has mountains. Foreign policy expert and Zenger Media CEO Richard Miniter has said the same about Russia, that there are many natural, easy routes for invading troops that make its leadership naturally skeptical of neighbors that aren’t on board with Russia itself. More on this toward review’s end.
Back to Poland, Pomfret reports that during WWII (p. 52) “Poland lost almost 20 percent of its population, the highest percentage of any nation in the war.” More specifically, Pomfret writes on p. 81 that “on the eve of World War II, Poland, next to the United States, had been home to the second largest agglomeration of Jews in the world,” but that after the war, barely 90,000 Jews remained. One is sickened, while also marveling at the revolting horror of it all.
Notable here is that after these abuses to humanity, the Poles per Pomfret (p. 82) aimed to make up for what was done to Polish Jews during the war. In the 1990s their way of making amends was through helping transfer Soviet Jews to Israel.
About this migration, George Gilder made the point in The Israel Test (review here) that the former Soviet Union’s loss of its Jewish population between 1970 and 1991 was a “frontal lobotomy” that it never recovered from economically, but that has told the tale of Israel’s soaring prosperity since. Think about Poland with the latter in mind. How much staggering academic, cultural, financial, and entrepreneurial talent did it lose to this most tragic of wars?
Poland, like Hungary, should be one of the richest, most advanced countries in the world today. Which is no insight. At the same time, it must be said as a counter to the sick notion promoted by PhD economists that war is economically stimulative. No, war is the opposite. It’s decline, and it’s decline for everyone. The U.S. was a fraction of what it could have been after WWII, in the decades after, and still is today.
Stop and think not just how rich Poland would be today absent the war, but the U.S. and the world if Poland had never been so thoroughly run over by abject human stupidity. People are always, always, always additive. There was quite simply no economic boost for the U.S. from the rest of the world being on its back after the war. It was all decline, and the unseen relative to where we would be absent the war should boggle any sentient mind. Only for the indignities foisted on Poland, and by extension the world, to continue.
Pomfret notes (p. 53) Stalin’s argument at Yalta, that the Soviet Union had to be repaid for its losses during the war. This of course led to Poland being left to the Soviet Union, which meant ever more precious time and advance taken from the Polish people. And what did the world lose as Russia lost 28 million to the war?
Referencing Robert Mundell, “the only closed economy is the world economy.” Which means communism, socialism, statism, war, and other cruel ideas foisted on us by government are always sad, progress-restraining global events.
About this truth, there’s an argument that Ronald Reagan grasped it more than any other statesman. Never forget that the CIA not only viewed the Soviet Union as strong, but its economy as something that worked. Reagan knew differently. Lacking a PhD, he didn’t lack common sense. The Soviet Union would fall into history’s “dustbin” simply because Reagan understood human nature, and communism runs counter to human nature.
About Reagan, Pomfret writes (p. 60) that his “Tear Down This Wall” speech wasn’t just a message to the Soviet Union’s Mikhail Gorbachev, it was also a message to West Germany that the U.S. “wouldn’t accept any side deal with the Soviets – especially one that guaranteed the neutrality of a future united Germany or recognized a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.” Reagan’s expressed view about the U.S. relative to the Soviet Union was “we win, they lose.” The blunt confidence implied in the latter was also a comment about what a mistake Yalta was for the countries wrapped into the Soviet sphere by it, along with the damage done to them and the world by it.
Reagan wouldn’t allow Yalta to happen again, and he wouldn’t because communist countries are powerless on the world stage exactly because they have no economies with which to project power. Said another way war, whether cold or hot, is expensive. And the Soviets had no money since communism is a bankrupt notion.
To those who will say that China is a communist country with money, please reread what you believe. There’s an obvious contradiction there that foreign policy/intelligence types with no economic sense didn’t grasp during the Soviet era, and that they still don’t grasp now.
Contemplating the various disasters visited on Poland throughout time, it’s useful to remember what American readers of this review know intimately: people migrate away from tragedy. Or they escape the dysfunction foisted on them by governments. Pomfret observes (p. 63) that “everyone in Poland seemed to have an uncle in the United States or know someone who did.” Yes, some got out. Poland’s loss, but the U.S. and the world’s gain.
It’s worth remembering now as American conservatives who should know better disdain the migration of people from “shithole countries,” who fear insufficient “assimilation,” or who worry that migrants are bringing the “statist” qualities of the country exited to the United States. Nonsense. Utter nonsense. Those who exit what’s anti-life and progress for the abundance born of freedom in the United States have revealed themselves as American for having done so.
People are rarely, if ever, a cost, or a job taken. Surely not in a free country. The more people in a free country, the better and more remunerative the work. To see why just extrapolate the pin factory Adam Smith visited in the 18th century to the U.S. as a nation. The more people who’ve entered the work force, and yes, the more people who’ve entered the global work force, the better off those lucky enough to work in the U.S. have become.
Supply and demand as an altar at which to worship economically implies that people are a burden, that their numeracy represents falling wages. Quite the opposite. With progress and production, we’re always better off and better paid the more people there are simply because the more hands and machines at work, the more specialized each hand becomes. Specialized hands are productive ones, and their pay reflects this truth.
It’s a reminder that intelligence of the foreign policy variety is substandard in many ways precisely because the academic theories underpinning intelligence are stalked by so much fallacy. So, while Senator Moynihan rightly viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as an intelligence failure, he arguably missed the bigger story that the CIA’s blindness to reality was rooted far more in economics than it had to do with faulty intelligence. See Cato Institute co-founder Ed Crane.
In 1982 he visited the Soviet Union with his fellow Cato co-founder, industrialist Charles Koch. Writing about his visit upon return, Crane was clear that the Soviet Union was in the midst of abject failure. The latter was evident in the hunched, depressed look of the people, the thoroughly decrepit nature of cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg, not to mention the horrors of the airports in this most wrecked of “powers.” To offer up but one example, there was no toilet paper in the bathrooms. Instead, slim amounts of what compared better with sandpaper than tissue was doled out from outside bathrooms lest – you guessed it – people steal what was in limited supply. Again, how did intelligence not see the obvious, that there was no economy underpinning what was so dysfunctional? Reading Pomfret, the questions kept coming up.
Still, amid the Soviet Union’s ongoing dysfunction there were growing attempts by U.S. intelligence to connect with the Poles. In January 1980, Pomfret reports (p. 74) that career CIA officer John Palevich reached out to Poland’s SB head in Lisbon with a message that “The United States wishes to initiate liaison” with the Poland’s intelligence services. The ice was happily breaking. Notable there is that during a 1990 meeting at the Hotel Tivoli in Lisbon, Polish intelligence officials p. 86 “came to Lisbon with intelligence that indicated an impending collapse of the USSR.”
The Poles were evidently ahead of the world’s allegedly greatest intelligence service, but more important for the engrossing history offered by Pomfret is that (p. 89) Polish intelligence would be reoriented “toward espionage on, not with, the Soviets.” Progress. Plus it’s evident from the information being passed on that they knew the Soviets better than the Americans did, after which it can be said as a slight defense of the CIA that the Poles knew the declinist horrors of collectivism intimately.
The growing intelligence ties eventually paid off for the U.S., or not. Iraq looms large. Pomfret indicates that in 1990, more than 5,000 Polish engineers, cartographers, and administrators had been working in the Middle Eastern country. This was of particular importance with American officialdom still in Iraq after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces. How to get them out? Thank goodness for the Poles.
That’s because a country seemingly as backwards as Iraq to American eyes, wasn’t backwards in all ways. About this, Pomfret cites internal security computers that were apparently quite advanced, and that created enormous challenges for U.S. officialdom intent on getting Americans out. The Poles who knew the country well were the answer, and Pomfret’s retelling of American intelligence officials being told by their Polish counterparts to get wasted and act like wasted Poles to trick Iraqis at a Northern Iraq checkpoint more than made an already interesting book worth it.
Furthermore, the excellent work of Polish intelligence officials (p. 153) instigated more advanced cooperation between the countries. As Pomfret put it, “After Desert Storm, the door flew open” to spy cooperation between the U.S. and Poland.
Most interesting about the book in consideration of the present is what happened with the Soviet Union’s collapse. Pomfret quotes President George H.W. Bush (#41) on p. 164 as being very careful about not trash talking the declining enemy. In H.W. Bush’s words, “I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall.”
Better yet, and fascinating in consideration of the present, Pomfret notes (p. 165) how Secretary of State James Baker communicated to Gorbachev that “There would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction…one inch to the east.” It’s fascinating to think about today, and for reasons having to do with Ukraine. Right or wrong, at least in the past it was seemingly accepted wisdom within the foreign policy establishment that the Russians were very sensitive to border questions, and that this was a line that a U.S. with all the proverbial cards would not cross.
Consider all this vis-à-vis another anecdote care of Pomfret. On p. 166 he cites a 1992 occurrence in which Poland’s deputy minister of defense Radoslaw Sikorski brought up NATO “enlargement.” Sikorski was being rather up front about his aims there, that Poland very much desired inclusion. In response, Pomfret reports that “US Ambassador Thomas Simons stood up and walked out.” Love it or hate it, this was the accepted way of things at the time. The Russians would not be messed with in that way.
Of course, what positioned Poland for eventual NATO inclusion was growing ties between intelligence services in the two countries, Poland’s effectiveness in intelligence, but also the genius of its elite military units in Iraq. Poland joined NATO, along with the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999.
It’s more than interesting now considering Ukraine, and the perception that Joe Biden’s mention of possible NATO membership for Ukraine as having played a role in Russia’s eventual invasion. Was it pre-emptive? What does Pomfret think? So many questions raised by an excellent book, though not all of them laudatory of the U.S. intelligence services.
Fascinating as John Pomfret’s book is, it’s difficult to read it without feeling anger about American intelligence. If in fact they were bumblers, then it’s difficult to not be very angry. Just the same, it would cause your reviewer to be quite a bit angrier if the Polish perception of U.S. intelligence failures was correct, that the bumbling was a pose. How sick-inducing if so, particularly with all that’s happened since From Warsaw With Love was released in 2021.